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The Inherent Power of the Federal Courts to
Compel Participation in Nonbinding Forms of
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Amy M. Pugh and Richard A. Bales*
INTRODUCTION
Consulting firms on a project to construct, operate, and main-
tain the North Coast Superaqueduct Project sued the general con-
tractor, subcontractors, and insurers to recover their fees after a
segment of the pipeline burst.' The litigation quickly ballooned.2
Twelve parties became involved, plus "a welter of claims, counter-
claims, cross-claims, third party claims" and a myriad of issues
arose.3 To further complicate matters, one party moved to dismiss
for failure to join an indispensable party whose presence would
destroy the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court.4 In an effort
to resolve this complex case, the district judge ordered the parties
to mediation.5
In response, one of the parties, a defendant subcontractor, un-
successfully moved for reconsideration of the mediation order.6
The subcontractor then filed a mandamus petition arguing that
the district court lacked the authority to order mediation.7 In this
case, no local rules or statutes authorizing court-compelled Alter-
native Dispute Resolution (ADR) participation8 were yet in place,
so the requested mandamus petition raised the issue of whether
the district courts possess the inherent power to compel unwilling
litigants to participate in nonbinding methods of ADR.
* Richard Bales is an Associate Professor of Law at the Salmon P. Chase College of
Law, Northern Kentucky University. Professor Bales received his J.D. from Cornell Law
School in 1993. Amy Pugh anticipates receiving her J.D. in 2005 from the Salmon P. Chase
College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
1. In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2002).
2. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 139.
3. Id. at 145.
4. Id. at 139.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 139.
8. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2003). "Each United
States District court shall devise and implement its own [ADR] program, by local rule...
to encourage and promote the use of [ADRI in its district." Id.
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In In re Atlantic Pipe Corp. ,' the case detailed above, the First
Circuit held that federal district courts have the inherent power to
mandate nonconsensual, nonbinding ADR.1° Courts that adopt
this holding reason that the inherent power of the courts to man-
age their dockets and caseloads gives the courts the authority to
compel unwilling litigants to participate in ADR. Conversely,
other courts have held that the district courts do not have the in-
herent authority to order unwilling litigants to participate in ADR
processes." These courts narrowly construe inherent power and
believe that this power does not give courts the authority to com-
pel parties into nonbinding ADR processes.
This article argues that the federal district courts have the in-
herent authority to compel litigants to participate in nonbinding
ADR processes, when local statutes or rules are not in place to
authorize such compulsion. There are five reasons why the courts
have the inherent power to compel participation in ADR processes.
First, the federal courts' inherent powers are necessary to manage
the courts' affairs. Second, inherent powers are key to achieving
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. 2 Third, the
courts' inherent powers are strong, giving courts the ability to con-
trol the conduct of those appearing before them." Fourth, the use
of ADR eases crowded dockets by fostering settlement. 4 Fifth, all
civil cases are to use ADR processes. 5 Since courts have strong
inherent powers that are key to efficiently managing their pro-
ceedings and ADR is an effective case management technique that
is to be used in all civil cases, then courts must have the inherent
power to compel participation in nonbinding ADR.
Part I of this article explores the possible sources of court au-
thority to compel litigants into ADR processes. Part II examines
the federal circuit split on inherent authority. Part III argues that
9. 304 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2002).
10. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 145.
11. See, e.g., In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that federal dis-
trict courts do not have the inherent power to compel ADR participation).
12. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631 (1962).
13. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991).
14. In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1404 (11th Cir. 1991). The court in Novak praised the
use of ADR by holding that ADR fosters settlement which in turn results in savings in costs
and judicial resources and allows the court to efficiently manage their dockets. See id. In
this case, the court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a), authorizing the courts
to direct attorneys or pro se litigants to appear before it for pretrial conferences, did not
authorize the court to order an insurer for the defendant to appear at the pretrial confer-
ence. Id.
15. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2003).
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federal courts necessarily possess the inherent powers to compel
parties to participate in ADR processes based on the inherent
power to manage and control their docket. Part IV proposes two
possible ways to clarify the courts' inherent powers. Part V con-
cludes.
I. BACKGROUND: SOURCES OF JUDICIAL POWER
There are four potential sources of judicial authority for empow-
ering courts to order mandatory non-binding mediation of pending
cases: (1) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, (3) Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
1998, and (4) the court's inherent powers. Each source will be dis-
cussed in turn.
A. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
As adopted in 1938, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure authorized federal district courts to direct the attorneys for
the parties to appear in a court conference to consider matters to
aid in the disposition of cases. 16 Primarily, these conferences were
used to simplify the issues and plot the course of the lawsuit.'7 In
1983, Rule 16 was significantly amended to grant express author-
ity to federal district courts to consider settlement and the use of
ADR in resolving cases. In 1993, Rule 16 was further amended to
define and clarify the power of federal courts to compel unwilling
litigants into nonbinding forms of ADR. Each amendment and its
subsequent effect will be discussed.
1. The 1983 Amendment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 was amended in 1983 to
grant express authority to federal district courts at pretrial con-
ferences to consider settlement and the use of special procedures
to assist in resolving disputes. 8 The amendment gave courts dis-
cretion to direct the parties' attorneys and any unrepresented par-
ties "to appear before [them] for a conference or conferences before
trial for such purposes as . . . facilitating the settlement of the
16. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 (1938) (Rule 16 has since been amended in 1983 and 1993).
17. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1938) (Rule 16 has since been
amended in 1993).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), (c) (1983) (Rule 16 has since been amended in 1993).
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case." 9 Ambiguity was caused by the deletion of a previous draft
of the Judicial Conference Report, to the 1983 amendment, con-
taining the phrase "only with the voluntary consent of the par-
ties."20 Following adoption of the amendment, some courts held
the deletion indicated that the district courts could compel ADR
participation; other courts held it did not.
The Seventh Circuit decision of Standrell v. Jackson County,
Ill.21 exemplified the courts that held the 1983 version of Rule 16
did not authorize the court to compel nonconsensual ADR This
case was a civil rights action brought by the Strandells, the par-
ents of decedent, Michael Strandell, against Jackson County, Illi-
nois. 21 Jackson County had arrested, strip-searched, and impris-
oned Michael, who was being held as a pretrial detainee; Michael
committed suicide following his detainment.23 During a pretrial
conference, the district court ordered the parties to participate in a
summary jury trial, a type of ADR.24 The plaintiffs, the Stran-
dells, refused to participate in the ADR for fear the process would
divulge privileged statements.25 The district court rejected this
argument, holding the Strandells' attorney in criminal contempt
and fining him $500 for refusing to proceed with the summary
jury trial.26 The attorney appealed, arguing that the district court
lacked the power to compel a summary jury proceeding.27
The Seventh Circuit held that the 1983 version of Rule 16 alone,
with no local rules or statutes to authorize compulsion in ADR, did
not authorize the court to compel participation in a nonbinding
summary jury trial.28 The court concluded that the intent of Rule
16 was to foster the use of ADR techniques, but Rule 16 did not
require that unwilling litigants be sidetracked from the courts of
litigation and into ADR techniques.29 Thus, the Strandell decision
narrowly construed the powers of the courts under Rule 16.
19. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(a) (1983) (Rule 16 has since been amended in 1993).
20. Federal Reserve Bank of Minn. v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 608 (Minn.
Cir. 1998) (interpreting the deletion of the words "only with the voluntary contest" to indi-
cate that compelled participation was consistent with the amendment).
21. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
22. Strandrell, 838 F.2d at 884.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 885.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Strendrell, 838 F.2d at 884.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 887.
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However, in the 1988 decision of Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc.,3 ° the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota held that a district court had the
power to compel participation in a nonbinding summary jury trial
in light of the court's inherent powers and Rule 16.31 This prod-
ucts liability case arose from the defendant's fire-proofing of the
building with asbestos-containing products. 32 The plaintiff alleged
property damage and subsequent damage to the health of its em-
ployees from the asbestos exposure. 3  The district court ordered
the parties to participate in a summary jury trial . Both parties
requested to have their participation excused because of the costs
of the procedure.35 Their requests were denied.36
In denying the request, the court held that district courts have
the ability under Rule 16 and the courts' inherent power to compel
ADR participation. This court interpreted the deletion of a pre-
vious draft of the Judicial Conference Report 8 to mean that com-
pelled participation in summary jury trial was consistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the court in Carey-
Canada, Inc. broadly interpreted the power authorized by Federal
Rule 16 by holding the court could compel nonbinding ADR par-
ticipation.
Similarly, in the 1988 decision of Arabian American Oil Co. v.
Scarfone,"° the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida held that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules
16(a)(1), 16(a)(5), and 16(c)(11) were a basis to compel unwilling
litigants to use summary trial procedures." In this civil case, the
court evaluated the defendants' motion to be dismissed from par-
ticipation in a court-ordered summary jury trial.42 In praise of
ADR techniques, the court noted that even if the pretrial sum-
30. 123 F.R.D. 603 (Minn.Cir. 1998).
31. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. at 608.




36. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. at 603.
37. Id. at 604.
38. See Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. at 608 (interpreting the deletion of the words
"only with the voluntary consent" to indicate that compelled participation was consistent
with the amendment).
39. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. at 607.
40. 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).




mary procedures do not achieve settlement, the value of the pro-
cedures are immeasurable to the later binding trial since parties
come more fully prepared because the summary jury procedure
crystallizes the issues and the proof.43 The court also held that
summary jury trials do not abolish the parties' rights because the
parties are still entitled to a trial if the ADR does not lead to set-
tlement.4 Thus, Scarfone is another case that broadly interpreted
the power authorized by the 1983 amendment to Federal Rule 16
and the courts' inherent power.
Following the 1983 amendment of Rule 16, some courts held
that Rule 16 and the courts' inherent powers gave the courts the
power to compel nonbinding ADR; other courts held Rule 16 and
the courts' inherent powers did not. To address this conflict of
authority, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was fur-
ther amended in 1993.
2. 1993 Amendment
Congress most recently amended Rule 16 in 1993. The Advisory
Committee Notes to the amendment stated that the goal of the
changes was to eliminate questions regarding the authority of the
court to facilitate settlement.45 The present form of Rule 16(a)
empowers federal courts, in their discretion, to direct the attor-
neys for the parties and pro se parties to appear before them for
pretrial conferences that are designed to expedite the disposition
of the action, which include facilitating settlement.46 Rule 16(c)(9)
further permits courts to take appropriate action, with respect to
the "settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in re-
solving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule."'7
Thus, Rule 16 is used in conjunction with local statutes or rules to
compel litigants into nonbinding forms of ADR.
The federal courts have consistently interpreted the 1993
amendment as a direct limit on the courts' power under Rule 16 in
that courts must rely on local rule or statute to compel unwilling
litigants to participate in ADR. An example is the 1996 decision of
State of Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc.," in which the United
43. Id. at 449.
44. Id.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's notes. See also, State of Ohio v. Louis
Trauth Dairy, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 469, 470 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(1), (5).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
48. 164 F.R.D. 469 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
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States District Court for the Western Division of Ohio held that
Rule 16 must work in conjunction with a statute or local rule to
compel ADR participation.49
This case was brought by the State of Ohio alleging price fixing
by the dairies." The court ordered the parties to participate in a
summary jury trial.5 The defendants moved to be excused from
the proceedings." The motion was denied because, in Ohio, a local
rule authorized the discretion of the court to "assign any civil case
for a summary jury trial, mandatory, non-binding arbitration
hearing, settlement week conference, or other alternative method
of dispute resolution." 3 Therefore, the local rule authorized the
court to compel the litigants into ADR.54
The amended version of Rule 16 may have addressed the courts'
power to compel litigants to participate in ADR under Rule 16, but
it did not resolve the issue of the courts' inherent powers to compel
nonbinding forms of ADR. The Advisory Committee's Notes to the
1993 amendment state the rule "does not attempt to resolve ques-
tions as to the extent a court would be authorized to require [ADR]
proceedings as an exercise of its inherent powers."55 Thus, the in-
herent powers of the court to compel ADR participation are not
defined or limited by Rule 16.
B. Local Rules Adopted Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990
A second potential source of judicial authority to order parties to
participate in nonbinding ADR is the Civil Justice Reform Act
(CJRA) of 1990.56 The CJRA required every federal district across
the country to develop and implement a civil justice plan to reduce
the costs and delay of civil justice within the district.57 In develop-
ing the CJRA, Congress made two key decisions regarding civil
justice reform within the federal system. 5 The first was that the
49. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 164 F.R.D. at 470-71.
50. Id. at 469.
51. Id. at 470.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 471 (quoting Southern District of Ohio Local Rule 53.1).
54. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 164 F.R.D. at 471.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
56. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1990).
57. Id.
58. Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the Southern District of Texas:
Creating and Implementing a Cost and Reduction Plan Under the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990, 11 REV. LITIG. 165, 173 (1992).
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reform was to be accomplished locally and was to be based on the
recommendations of district-wide community advisory groups that
would be comprised of not only federal court personnel but also
the lawyers and clients.59 The second decision made by Congress
supported increased judicial case management, more extensive
than the pretrial conferences required by the Federal Rules. °
Supporting the creation of the CJRA, Congress found that the
use of ADR should be expanded and that ADR should be used in
civil litigation.' The Advisory Group that was formed under the
CJRA created The Subcommittee on Alternate Dispute Resolution
to expand the use of ADR.6" The Subcommittees' job was to evalu-
ate the types of ADR and how best to use them in settlement.
63
Thus, the CJRA was designed to increase use of ADR, noting ADR
as one way to reduce the costs and delays of civil litigation.
Although the CJRA was created with a sunset provision and has
expired, many districts continue to apply local procedures that
they adopted under the CJRA.' These procedures are authorized
to continue under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
1998.65
In Atlantic Pipe Corp., the First Circuit stated that these local
rules, created under the CJRA, may provide authority to order
participation in nonbinding ADR processes.6 The court noted that
the District of Puerto Rico adopted a plan to institute a method of
ADR pursuant to the CJRA, but the creation of local rules or stat-
utes regarding ADR never occurred. Without the local rules,
CJRA does not authorize the court to compel parties to participate
in nonbinding ADR processes.68  Thus, the CJRA, like Rule 16,
does not resolve the issue of whether the federal district courts
have the inherent authority to compel ADR participation.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 174.
61. Id. at 173.
62. Id. at 178-79.
63. Mullenix, supra note 53, at 179.
64. Carl Tobias, Did the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 Actually Expire?, 31 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 887, 891 (1998).
65. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(c) (2003).
66. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 140.
67. Id. at 140-41.
68. Id. at 141.
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C. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998
Another source of judicial authority is the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998 (ADR Act).69 The ADR Act provides broad
authority for federal district courts to develop ADR programs."
The Act requires every district court to devise and implement its
own ADR program and to require litigants in all civil cases to use
an ADR process." The Act also allows existing programs to con-
tinue, like those formed following the CJRA, as long as the pro-
grams are effective and meet the purpose of the statute. 2 The
provisions do not provide guidance as to the proper role of ADR
alongside traditional adjudication, and tremendous discretion is
left to the courts as to which forms of ADR are suitable and how to
structure the procedures. 73  The Act also gives the courts the dis-
cretionary power to adopt local rules or statutes that work in con-
junction with the Act to compel participation in nonbinding ADR
74processes.
Under the Act, many states have enacted some form of manda-
tory mediation, by local rule or statute, to empower courts to com-
pel participation by litigants. Indiana,' North Carolina, 6 Dela-
ware, ' Louisiana,78 Alabama, 9 Montana," Maine8 and Texas82 all
have adopted various types of mandatory mediation programs de-
signed to address various civil actions in the courts. 3 Many states
mandate mediation for family law disputes by adopting a local
rule or statute under the ADR Act.' Both Kentucky85 and Califor-
69. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2003).
70. Caroline Harris Crowne, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Imple-
menting a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1768, 1768 (2001).
71. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2003).
72. Id. at § 651(c).
73. Crowne, supra note 69, at 1793.
74. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2003).
75. IND. CODE § 2.2 (2003).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (1999).
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 7702 (2003).
78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4108 (West 2000).
79. ALA. CODE § 6-6-20 (2003).
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 54 (2003).
81. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251 (West 1998).
82. TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. §154.021 (Vernon 2003).
83. Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L.
REV. 367, 374-77 (2001).
84. Id. at 378.
85. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §403.036 (2003).
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nia s5 have adopted some form of court-mandated mediation for
family law disputes such as child custody and/or divorce.87
Despite the broad sweeping provisions of the Act, authorization
under the Act to compel litigants to participate in ADR is limited
to local rule.88 Absent a local rule, the Act itself does not authorize
any court to compel ADR.88 Although the power to compel ADR
under the Act is limited, the Act does not refer to the courts' in-
herent powers. Thus, like Rule 16 and the CJRA, the ADR Act
does not conclusively resolve the issue of whether the courts' in-
herent power can compel parties to participate in nonbinding
forms of ADR.0
D. Inherent Powers
The courts' inherent powers are the fourth possible source of ju-
dicial authority to compel ADR participation. The Supreme Court
has defined inherent powers as those powers "which cannot be
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exer-
cise of all others."9 The courts' inherent powers are non-specified,
and these powers have not been specifically granted.92 Instead,
the federal courts' inherent powers are implied by Article III of the
Constitution, which grants express authority to the federal
judges.93 The grant implies that they have ancillary inherent
powers that are essential to exercise their enumerated ones.9 4
These vaguely defined powers are the inherent powers of the
court.
Traditionally, the inherent powers of the court have concerned
docket management.95 Docket management concerns include con-
solidating cases, scheduling trial dates, granting continuances and
86. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170 (West 2000).
87. Streeter-Schaefer, supra note 82, at 379-80.
88. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 141.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 142. The First Circuit noted that under the Act, the courts' power to author-
ize compulsory ADR participation was limited to those jurisdictions where a formal ADR
program had been established by rule or statute. Id. However, the Act did not strip the
courts of their inherent power to compel such participation. Id.
91. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (citing United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32,
34 (1812)).
92. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738 (2001).
93. Id. at 847.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 760-61.
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recesses," dismissing cases for failure to prosecute" or for failing
to comply with the courts' orders,98 sanctioning parties,99 and ap-
pointing special masters to assist in fact-finding.0 0 The courts
have also used their inherent powers to compel parties to partici-
pate in ADR processes. If a litigant does not participate in court-
ordered ADR, then the litigant is charged with failure to prose-
cute. 01 Thus, the district courts' inherent powers authorize a va-
riety of tools to facilitate control over cases. A discussion of cases
relevant to inherent powers will follow.
In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,1"2 the Supreme Court broadly
interpreted the inherent powers of the federal courts. This case
grew out of a collision between the plaintiffs car and the defen-
dant's train.0 3 After six years of litigation, and following the pre-
vious postponement of two trial dates by the defendant's unsuc-
cessful motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court
notified both litigants' attorneys that a pretrial conference was set
to be held.0 4 On the day of the conference, the plaintiffs counsel
notified the judge's secretary that he could not be there because he
was doing some paper work, but he could be there the next after-
noon or anytime the following day.0 5 The court reviewed the case
and found the counsel did not show good reason for the nonap-
pearance. °6 In an exercise of the court's inherent power, the court
dismissed the action for failure to prosecute.' °7 The plaintiff ap-
pealed, the Seventh Circuit affirmed,0 8 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 0 9
In resolving the case, the Supreme Court held that federal
courts have the inherent power to dismiss a case because of failure
to prosecute." 0 This ability, held the Court, is necessary to pre-
vent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to avoid backup
96. Id. at 760.
97. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 636 (1962).
98. Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995)
99. Baker v. Rivair Flying Service, Inc., 744 F.2d 1438, 1442 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2016 (1985).
100. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1988).
101. Pushaw, supra note 91, at 762.
102. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
103. Link, 370 U.S. at 627.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 627-28.
106. Id. at 628-29.
107. Id. at 629.
108. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 291 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1961).
109. 368 U.S. 918 (1961).
110. Link, 370 U.S. at 629.
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in the courts' dockets."' The Supreme Court also noted that in-
herent powers are essential in order to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.' By holding that inherent pow-
ers are essential and that they allow district courts to terminate a
parties' constitutional right to trial, the Court indicated that in-
herent powers are strong.
The Court in Link held that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure do not limit the courts' inherent powers unless a Rule specifi-
cally references a direct limitation on the courts power."3  The
Court stated that Rule 41(b). 4 was not created to abrogate the in-
herent power of the courts to clear their calendars of cases gone
dormant because of the inaction of parties."' This holding denoted
that the rule does not abrogate the inherent powers of the courts
by mere negative implication."6
In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,"7 the Supreme Court again
broadly construed the district courts' inherent powers. This case
was brought by a purchaser, NASCO, for specific performance of a
contract with Chambers to sell a television station to NASCO." 8
Specific performance was decreed by the district court and Cham-
bers appealed."9 Then, Chambers engaged in a series of actions to
"frustrate the sale's consummation."2 ° On appeal, the court af-
firmed the judgment for NASCO and remanded the case. 2' On
remand, the district court, relying on its inherent power, imposed
sanctions against Chambers for attorney's fees and expenses for
nearly one million dollars for frivolous appeal. 2 Chambers ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.'23 Two
holdings from Chambers are relevant to the inherent power of the
courts, and each will be discussed in turn.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 630.
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) states that the defendant may move for failure to
prosecute, but the rule makes no mention of the courts' sua sponte ability to dismiss the
case for failure to prosecute. See id.
115. Link, 370 U.S. at 631.
116. See id. at 630.
117. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).




122. Id. In addition to frivolous appeal, the sanctions also addressed acts of fraud and
attempts to reduce NASCO to exhausted compliance. Id.
123. 498 U.S. 807 (1990).
Vol. 42
Alternative Dispute Resolution
First, the Supreme Court held that federal courts sitting in di-
versity could assess attorney fees as a sanction for bad-faith con-
duct, even without applicable rules or statutes under state law.
1 4
The Court held that the district courts may use their inherent
power if neither statutes nor rules are "up to the task."'25 The
court further noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did
not displace the inherent power of the courts to impose sanc-
tions. 12  Therefore, if the rules or statutes do not facilitate the
courts' ability to control their affairs, then the courts may rely on
their inherent powers to do so.
Second, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts have the
"inherent power to manage their own proceedings and to control
the conduct of those who appear before them." 7 This power may
be used to punish conduct of those who abuse the judicial proc-
ess.'28 The ability to control the parties to litigation denotes that
the courts' inherent powers are quite strong.
Similarly, many circuit decisions have broadly construed the
courts' inherent powers. In Baker v. Rivair Flying Serv., Inc.,12
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
the district court had the inherent power to sanction the attorneys
for contumacious behavior, even before Rule 16 was amended to
authorize such sanctions.1
30
In Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc.,3  the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit indicated that the courts' inherent pow-
ers were strong by holding that the court had the ability to dis-
miss a case for failure to obey an order. 32 And in Reilly v. United
124. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 33.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 42, 46.
127. Id. at 33.
128. Id.
129. 744 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1984).
130. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1442. This case was a three party action in which the plaintiffs
attorney, after being denied a motion for a continuance, moved for another continuance
based on the failure to depose a witness. Id. at 1439. The attorney then announced he
might have been responsible for the deposition delay. Id. The court granted the continu-
ance but sanctioned the attorney for his negligence. Id. at 1440. This holding was prior to
the amendment to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that authorizes imposing
such sanctions. Id. at 1441. The court held that the spirit and purpose of the amendment
had always been within the power of the courts. Id.
131. 57 F.3d 1406 (5th Cir. 1995).
132. Woodson, 57 F.3d at 1417. This was a products liability action that was dismissed
under the courts' inherent power as a sanction for the plaintiff's failure to follow the courts'
orders. Id. at 1407, 1415. On appeal, the court cited Link v. Wabash to support the holding
that it was within the courts' inherent power to dismiss the case. Id. at 1417.
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States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the courts' inherent powers authorized appointing tech-
nical advisors in complex cases.'33 Thus, the inherent powers of
the court are strong and grant a variety of discretionary remedies.
However, the courts' inherent powers were narrowly construed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
United States v. Horn.' In this case, the court annulled the dis-
trict court's order, which had imposed sanctions comprised of at-
torney fees and costs, holding that sovereign immunity barred the
district court from using its inherent powers to assess attorney
fees and costs.' The First Circuit reasoned that inherent power
had definite limits and that the power is interstitial; it applied
only when there is no effective alternative provided by rule, state
or constitutional clause."' By concluding that inherent power is
limited by rule or statute, this holding narrowly interpreted the
courts' inherent power.
In applying this narrow interpretation of the courts' inherent
powers, the inherent powers of the court are not limited unless a
local rule or statute directly displaces the inherent power. If there
are no local rules or statutes on point, then the inherent powers of
the court are not affected. Therefore, the inherent powers of the
court generally are strong and grant the court a variety of discre-
tionary measures that are necessary to control the affairs of the
court and to manage those that appear before the court.
II. SPLIT OF AUTHORITY
A split of authority as to whether the federal district courts
have the inherent power to compel unwilling litigants into non-
binding forms of ADR has developed. Two camps have emerged.
One camp proclaims that it is within the inherent powers of the
court to compel nonbinding ADR on litigants as a necessary power
of the court to effectively manage its docket and caseload. The
133. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156. In this medical malpractice case, the doctors' alleged negli-
gence during labor caused a baby to be born with severe brain damage. Id. at 153. The
defendants appealed the district courts' appointment of a technical advisor to assist in
damage calculations. Id. at 153-55. On appeal, the court held that the district courts'
inherent powers included the ability to appoint technical advisors in complex cases. Id. at
156. The court noted "after all [the Civil Rules] were never meant to become the sole re-
pository of all a federal court's authority." Id.
134. 29 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1994).
135. Id. at 757.
136. Id. at 760.
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other camp holds that inherent powers are to be narrowly con-
strued and do not extend to authorize the compulsion of litigants
into nonbinding ADR participation. The division among federal
district courts will be explored though recent decisions.
A. Camp One: Courts Have the Inherent Power
A recent example of a decision holding that district courts have
the inherent power to compel ADR participation is Atlantic Pipe
Corp. 137 In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that federal courts have the inherent power to
compel participation in nonbinding, nonconsensual ADR when the
local rules are not yet in force to authorize compelling the litigants
into ADR.
138
The decision in Atlantic Pipe Corp. began as a suit to recover
fees for a consulting service. 139 Recall from the introduction, this
was a complex case involving twelve parties, numerous claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, and a myriad of
issues. 40 In an effort to facilitate settlement, the district court
ordered the parties to mediation."' One party, a subcontractor,
unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the order."' The sub-
contractor then sought a writ of mandamus prohibiting the non-
consensual mediation.
143
In reviewing the writ of mandamus, the First Circuit had to de-
cide whether the district courts had the inherent power, apart
from positive law, to compel nonbinding participation in ADR.
4
1
In this district, there were no local rules or statutes to authorize
ADR participation.' Without the local rules authorization, other
possible sources for authority to compel ADR participation such as
local rules, an applicable statute, and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were not available to authorize compulsion in ADR par-
ticipation.'46 The First Circuit held that the district courts have




141. Id. at 139.
142. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 139.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 143.
145. Id. at 140.
146. Id. at 140-43.
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substantial inherent power to manage their docket,147 and this in-
herent power gave the district court the inherent power to compel
ADR participation.
14
While the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlantic Pipe Corp.
gave the green light to the district courts to use their inherent
powers to compel ADR participation, the court also noted four lim-
its to the inherent powers of a district court. 14' The first limit is
that inherent powers must be used to enhance the court's proc-
esses including the orderly and expeditious disposition of pending
cases."' Second, inherent powers cannot be used to contradict an
applicable statute or rule.' Third, inherent powers must be used
in a manner that comports with procedural fairness.'52 And
fourth, the inherent powers "must be exercised with restraint and
discretion.""3  However, these limitations do not affect the
strength of the courts' inherent power to compel nonbinding ADR
participation when there is no local rule or statute on point and
the order comports with fairness.
Previous decisions have held that the federal district courts
have the inherent power to compel litigants to participate in ADR.
Recall from Part I, A-1 above, the decisions in Carey-Canada, Inc.
and Scarfone. Each case will be further discussed.
In Carey-Canada, Inc., the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota held that in light of the courts' inherent
powers and under the 1983 version of amended Rule 16, the dis-
trict courts were authorized to compel ADR participation.14  The
court also held that the use of its discretion [inherent powers]
must be protected. 5' If the courts' discretion is not protected,
stated this court, then the courts can not effectively and efficiently
function and will fail to meet their duty to provide a "just and
speedy disposition of every case.""6 The court also praised the use
of ADR, noting that it was a valuable tool that facilitated settle-
ment, which in turn saved money and judicial resources."7 There-
147. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 140-43 (quoting Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370
U.S. at 630-31).
148. Id. at 145.
149. Id. at 143.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 143.
153. Id.
154. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. at 608.
155. Id. at 604.




fore, this case, like Atlantic Pipe Corp., held that the court had the
inherent power to compel litigants to participate in ADR.
Another case which held that courts have the inherent power,
under the 1983 Rule 16, to compel nonbinding ADR participation
is Scarfone. In this case, the court held that Rule 16 and the
courts' inherent powers were a basis to compel nonconsensual
ADR participation.'58 The court also held that the district courts'
inherent power should not be abrogated because the district courts
are in the best position to process and evaluate the cases before
them.159 The court noted that the courts are adversely affected if
their inherent powers do not authorize them to perform the duties
of a just, speedy, and inexpensive trial.6 ° Thus, this decision, like
the decisions of Atlantic Pipe Corp. and Carey-Canada, broadly
construed the inherent powers of the court in that the powers
could compel litigants to participate in nonbinding ADR.
Therefore, federal circuit and district courts have held that the
district courts' inherent powers authorize compelling litigants to
participate in nonbinding ADR processes. These courts reasoned
that the federal district court's power to manage its docket, in or-
der to fulfill its duties of a speedy and just trial, authorizes the
courts to compel ADR participation. However, other circuit courts
have held that the power of the federal district courts to manage
their dockets does not extend to authorize compelling litigants to
participate in ADR. The following section will further analyze the
premise behind this holding.
B. Camp Two: Courts Lack the Inherent Power
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit decision of In
Re NLO, Inc.' provides an example of the camp which holds that
the district courts lack the inherent power to compel ADR partici-
pation.162 In this case, the employees of a uranium plant brought
suit alleging negligent exposure to dangerous levels of radioactive
and hazardous materials.'63 The district court ordered the parties
to participate in a summary jury trial, which would be open to the
158. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. at 448.
159. Id. at 449.
160. Id.
161. 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993).
162. NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d at 158.
163. Id. at 155.
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public.' The plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandamus prohibit-
ing the order to participate in the summary jury trial.'
In review of the writ of mandamus, the Sixth Circuit made two
key holdings. The first was that the district court lacked the in-
herent power to compel participation in the summary jury trial.'66
The second was that Rule 16 did not grant compulsory authority
for ADR' Each holding will be in turn discussed.
With respect to the first holding, that the district court lacked
the inherent power to compel participation in the summary jury
trial,166 the court reasoned that limits on the district court's power
were necessary because "power corrupts."'69 The court quoted
Richard Posner, stating that, "there are obvious dangers in too
broad an interpretation of the federal courts' inherent power ... it
encourages judicial high-handedness ('power corrupts')."7 ' Fur-
thering the argument against compelling litigants into ADR par-
ticipation, the court held that the time delay of the ADR process
was improper. 7' This case exemplified the approach that nar-
rowly construed the inherent power of the district court by holding
it was "misplaced" to use the inherent authority to justify manda-
tory ADR participation. '72
The second key holding was that Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure did not grant compulsory authority for ADR par-
ticipation. 173 The court interpreted the 1983 Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 16(c)(7) to indicate that the rule was designed to
explore and urge the use of ADR, rather than compel ADR on the
unwilling. 74 This decision was made before the 1993 amendment
clarified the proper role of Rule 16 in compelling ADR participa-
tion and the role of Rule 16 regarding the courts' use of its inher-
ent powers. 75 Yet, this court held that the courts' inherent powers
did not authorize court-compelled mediation.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 155.
166. Id. at 158.
167. NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d at 157.




172. NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d at 158.
173. Id. at 157.
174. Id.
175. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note (stating that the Rule does not
attempt to define the role of the inherent power of the court to compel ADR participation).
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Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Strandell held that the federal district courts lacked the power to
authorize the compelling of litigants into nonbinding ADR.1 6 Re-
call from the discussion of Strandell in Part I, A-1 above, the
Strandell court held that, under the 1983 version of Rule 16, the
district court lacked the power to compel ADR participation with-
out local rules or statutes to authorize such compulsion. 177 This
court also held that the district court lacked the discretionary or
inherent powers to compel ADR participation.'78 Narrowly con-
struing the district courts' inherent power, the Seventh Circuit
stated that "a crowded docket does not permit the court to avoid
the adjudication of cases properly within its congressionally-
mandated jurisdiction. 179
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Stran-
dell that courts lack inherent powers to compel ADR participation
because docket management does not condone the avoidance of
adjudicating trials.18° Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision in NLO, Inc. held that the courts could not rely on
their inherent powers to compel ADR participation because fears
of broad inherent powers would lead to judicial high-
handedness. 8' However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held in
Atlantic Pipe Corp. that the court had the inherent power to com-
pel ADR participation. Thus, there is a circuit split on the courts'
inherent power to compel nonbinding ADR participation. The role
of the courts' inherent powers will be further analyzed in Part III.
III. ANALYSIS
When no local statues or rules are on point, the question of
whether the federal district courts' inherent power can compel
litigants to participate in nonbinding ADR can be resolved based
on the analysis of the role of the courts' inherent powers and the
present use of ADR in civil litigation. The arguments for and
against inherent powers authorizing compulsion into ADR are
discussed below.
176. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 888.
180. Id.
181. NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d at 158.
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A. Arguments for Inherent Powers
This article advances five reasons why the federal district
courts' inherent powers authorize the court to compel ADR par-
ticipation. First, the inherent powers of the courts are necessary
to manage their proceedings. Second, inherent powers are key to
achieving orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.'82 Third,
the courts' inherent powers are strong, giving the court the ability
to control the conduct of those that appear before them.'83 Fourth,
ADR eases crowded dockets, which facilitates docket manage-
ment." And fifth, all civil cases are to use ADR processes.' 85
Since federal courts need inherent powers to manage their pro-
ceedings and facilitate docket management, and ADR is an effec-
tive docket management technique that is to be used in all civil
litigation, courts must have the inherent power to compel partici-
pation in nonbinding ADR.
The first reason the courts have the inherent powers to compel
nonbinding ADR participation is that the Supreme Court held in
Chambers that the courts' inherent powers are necessary to man-
age their proceedings and to control the parties appearing before
them.'86 Without the ability to manage their proceedings and con-
trol the parties that appear before them, the courts would be
awash in the constant and ever-changing needs and demands of
the parties. Therefore, if the court concludes that the use of ADR
methods would be an effective way to manage the litigation, then
the court has the inherent power to compel the litigants to partici-
pate in ADR.
The second reason the courts have the inherent power to compel
nonbinding ADR participation is that inherent powers are key to
achieving orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.'87 In Link
v. Wabash Railroad Co., the Supreme Court held that the courts'
inherent power to manage their proceedings and those that ap-
pear before them grants the courts the ability to resolve cases be-
fore them.'88 Arguably, without the inherent power to control the
litigation process, cases would continue on as the parties searched
for more evidence to advance their position. Thus, it follows that
182. Link, 370 U.S. at 631.
183. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 33.
184. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1404.
185. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2003).
186. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 33.




the courts have the inherent power to compel ADR participation,
in an effort to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.
The third reason that the courts have the inherent power to
compel nonbinding ADR participation is that the courts' inherent
power is strong. This premise is based on a number of decisions
that have broadly construed the courts' inherent powers. Inherent
powers have authorized the federal district courts to assess attor-
neys fees, even without the authorization of local rules or stat-
utes;189 to dismiss a case for failure to prosecuteS0 or for failure of a
party to obey the courts orders;'91 to appoint technical advisors in
complex cases;92 and to compel nonbinding ADR participation.
19 3
In Chambers the Supreme Court held that the federal courts may
rely on their inherent power if neither the rules or statutes are
"up to the task."194 Therefore, courts may rely on the strength of
their inherent power to authorize compulsion in nonbinding ADR
participation if the local rules or statutes are not yet in place.
The fourth reason the courts have the inherent power to compel
ADR participation is that ADR is an effective tool in case man-
agement. The use of ADR in the litigation process has been
praised in the Civil Justice Reform Act, the Alternative Dispute
Act, and numerous cases. Each source of ADR praise will be
discussed.
In creating both the CJRA and the ADR Act, Congress desired
to expand and increase the use of ADR. Congress found, in sup-
port of the CJRA, that the increased use of ADR was one way to
reduce the costs and delays of civil litigation.99 To further in-
crease the use of ADR, Congress passed the ADR Act, which re-
quires the use of ADR in all civil cases.'96 Thus, Congress believes
that ADR methods should be utilized in the courtroom.
In further praise of ADR, many cases have held that the use of
ADR methods is invaluable to the litigation process. In Scarfone,
the court noted that the benefits of using ADR, even if ADR does
not produce a settlement, is immeasurable to the later trial be-
189. Chambers, 501 at 33.
190. Link, 370 U.S. at 629.
191. Woodson, 57 F.3d at 1417.
192. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156.
193. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 145; Scarfone, 110 F.R.D. at 448; Carey-Canada,
Inc., 123 F.R.D. at 608.
194. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 33.
195. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1990).
196. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2003).
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cause both parties come fully prepared since the process crystal-
lizes the proof and issues. 9' Similarly, in Carey-Canada, Inc., the
court called ADR a valuable settlement tool that facilitates major
cost savings.198 Also, in NLO, Inc., the Sixth Circuit noted that
ADR is a valuable tool in expediting cases."' Finally, in Novak,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that ADR fosters settlement, which in
turn eases crowded dockets and results in saving both money and
judicial resources. 20 0  These cases have praised the use of ADR in
facilitating settlement which leads to decreasing the costs of liti-
gation and saves judicial resources.
Fifth, ADR is to be used in all civil litigation. The ADR Act of
1998 requires every federal court to create and use its own ADR
program.2 ' The Act also requires the use of ADR in all civil
cases.20 2 Thus, ADR is to be used in all civil litigation.
Because courts have strong inherent powers that are key to effi-
cient and orderly management of their proceedings and ADR is an
effective case management technique that is to be used in all civil
cases, it follows that courts must have the inherent power to com-
pel participation in nonbinding ADR.
B. Arguments Against Inherent Powers
There are three reasons advanced by the circuit courts that hold
that the inherent powers do not authorize nonbinding ADR par-
ticipation. The first is that a broad interpretation of inherent
powers, such as authorizing the compulsion into non-binding
ADR, encourages judicial high-handedness because power cor-
rupts. The second is that the courts lack the power to refer cases
to ADR that the court should be adjudicating. The third is that
the use of ADR delays the litigants' court dates. Each of these
premises will be discussed.
In NLO, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that the courts do not have
the inherent power to compel participation in nonbinding ADR
processes.2 ' The court reasoned that authorizing nonbinding par-
ticipation in ADR was a broad interpretation of inherent powers
that encouraged judicial "high-handedness" because power itself
197. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. at 449.
198. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. at 604.
199. NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d at 158.
200. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1404.
201. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2003).
202. Id.
203. 5 F.3d at 158.
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corrupts."° The Sixth Circuit reasoned that limits on the district
court's power were necessary because of the corruptive nature of
power itself.
Despite the compelling nature of the premise that power is cor-
ruptive, federal courts have the power to dismiss cases, sanction
parties, and the basic ability to "control the conduct of the par-
ties""°5 before them. If strong inherent powers are truly corrupting
the federal courts, then other more "powerful" court activities,
such as dismissal of a case, would also be under fire. Therefore,
the corruptive nature of power is not a convincing argument
against inherent powers to compel ADR participation. Since
courts have strong inherent powers, as in the authority to control
the conduct of parties to litigation, then courts must have the
power to compel ADR participation.
Another argument against the inherent power to compel ADR
participation is that courts should not refer their cases to ADR
when the courts themselves are supposed to be hearing the case.
In the decision of Strandell, the Seventh Circuit held that the
courts lacked the inherent power to compel litigants to participate
in ADR because docket management did not excuse the court from
the adjudication of cases it was supposed to hear. °6 This court
viewed ADR as an excuse not to hear the case.
The argument that the district courts use ADR to avoid cases
oversimplifies the nonbinding ADR approach. The ADR participa-
tion is used to foster settlement, but if no settlement is mutually
agreed upon, then the case goes to trial. Thus, the courts are not
excusing themselves of their duties by ordering the parties to par-
ticipate in ADR; the courts merely are encouraging settlement
earlier in the litigation process.
The third argument against the use of ADR is that ADR post-
pones the litigants' court date until the ADR process has occurred.
In NLO, Inc., the court held that the time delay caused by assem-
bling and participating in the ADR was improper.2 7 While the
ADR participation may cause a delay in trial date, most cases set-
tle before judgment is reached.0 8 Thus, the court sets a date and
204. Id. at 157.
205. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 32.
206. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
207. NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d at 158.
208. Campbell C. Hutchison, The Case for Mandatory Mediation, 42 LOY. L. REV. 85, 87




may even hear arguments only to have the case settled before
judgment is rendered. The encouragement of early settlement
through ADR participation may delay a trial time, but the advan-
tages of conserving scarce judicial resources are a strong argu-
ment that counters the time delay.
Dismissing the arguments against the courts' inherent powers
to compel ADR participation, this article argues that the federal
district courts have the inherent power to compel nonconsensual
participation in nonbinding ADR. The courts' inherent power
stems from the necessary ability of the courts to effectively man-
age their affairs and to achieve orderly and expeditious disposition
of cases.2 °9 Inherent powers give the courts the ability to manage
their proceedings and to control the conduct of those that appear
before them.21°  A majority of cases have acknowledged the
strength of the courts' inherent powers. Also, many courts have
praised the use of ADR to effectively manage the courts'
caseload.21" ' And finally, ADR is to be used in all civil cases.212
Therefore, the inherent power to compel participation in ADR
processes stems from the courts' inherent power to manage the
affairs of the court in order to fulfill its' duty to provide a "just,
speedy and inexpensive determination"212 of the cases before it.
IV. PROPOSAL
This article suggests two proposals to further clarify the inher-
ent powers of the federal district court to authorize court-ordered
participation in nonbinding forms of ADR. The first is an amend-
ment to the ADR Act. The second is an amendment to Federal
Rule 16, which would acknowledge the inherent powers of the
court. Each proposal will be discussed.
The first proposal is to amend to the ADR Act. The proposed
amendment to the ADR Act would make reference to the federal
courts' inherent powers and the federal courts' ability to compel
participation in nonbinding forms of ADR under the Act's provi-
sions. While the Act currently requires the federal courts to au-
thorize the use of ADR in all civil actions by local rule, the Act
should acknowledge the inherent power of the court to compel par-
209. Link, 370 U.S. at 631.
210. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 33.
211. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1404.
212. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2003).
213. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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ticipation in ADR if the local rule is not yet in place. Once the lo-
cal rules are established, then the inherent power is unnecessary
to compel participation in ADR.
The second proposal is an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 16(c)(9). While Rule 16(c)(9) currently per-
mits the court to take appropriate action with respect to the set-
tlement and use of special procedures to assist in resolving the
dispute, the action is to be based on local statute or rule."4 The
amendment should note that if local rule or statute is not yet in
place, then Rule 16 is to work in conjunction with the courts' in-
herent powers to compel participation in nonbinding forms of
ADR. This amendment would codify the majority common-law
approach that is apparent in the Atlantic Pipe Corp. holding that
courts have the inherent power to compel ADR participation.
In the interim, federal courts should adopt the approach of the
First Circuit in Atlantic Pipe Corp. This approach broadly inter-
prets the courts' inherent powers and holds that inherent powers
authorize compelling nonconsensual participation in ADR.
Thus, this article poses two possible ways to clarify and to ad-
vance the inherent powers of the federal courts. One is to amend
the ADR Act to acknowledge the ability of the court to invoke its'
inherent powers if the ADR Act requirements are not yet in place.
The second is to amend Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure to include authorization of the inherent powers of the court
to compel nonbinding ADR participation if the local rules or stat-
utes are not yet in place. In either scenario, the inherent powers
of the court need not be invoked once the local rules or statutes
have been established. In the interim, courts should rely on their
inherent powers to compel ADR participation.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal courts possess the inherent power to compel partici-
pation in nonbinding forms of ADR. The United States Supreme
Court has long acknowledged that inherent powers are necessary
to effectively manage the affairs of the courts and to control the
conduct of those appearing before them.215 The use of the courts'
inherent powers are key in the achievement of the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases." ' Also, many cases have con-
214. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
215. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 33.
216. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631 (1962).
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strued inherent powers as a strong force to be reckoned with, and
it has been held that inherent powers may be safely used when
the rules or statutes are not "up to the task."2 17 Furthermore, the
use of ADR is an effective tool in the management of court pro-
ceedings,218 and ADR is to be used in all civil cases.219 And the re-
cent decision of Atlantic Pipe Corp. held that it was within the in-
herent powers of the court to compel participation in ADR proc-
esses.20 Following the logic of these decisions, the federal district
courts have the inherent power to compel participation in ADR
when no local rule or statute is on point.
217. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 32.
218. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1404.
219. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C.A. § 651(b) (2003).
220. Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F. 3d at 143.
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